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A Study of the Effects of Certificate of Need Law on Inpatient Occupancy Rates

Abstract
Increasing healthcare costs and the deterioration of healthcare quality have always been major
concerns to policy makers in the United States, and Certificate of Need (CON) Law has been
implemented as one way to curb wasteful healthcare resource use. Theoretically, CON can lead to
a reduction in the number of beds as well as in the number of inpatient days (possibly by shortening
the length of patient stay). However, these two effects impact inpatient occupancy rate in opposite
directions. We test empirically to find out which of these two effects dominate. In this study, we
investigate the impact of CON and its stringency (which is different across states with CON Laws)
on inpatient occupancy rate using panel data, and find that on average CON legislation reduces
occupancy rate in inpatient units. Our tests evaluating CON and its features for endogeneity fail to
obtain statistical support.
Keywords: CON Law; Health Policy; Occupancy Rate; Inpatient Care

I.

Introduction

The U.S. per capita healthcare expenditure is one of the highest in the world. According to a study
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, it accounted for 17.9% of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) in 2010 (NCHS, 2012). Nearly one-third of this expenditure is attributed to
inpatient hospital services and related utilization. Specifically, between 1997 and 2011, aggregate
inflation-adjusted hospital costs grew by 3.6 percent annually (Weis, Barrett and Steiner, 2014).
Equally unfortunate is that the quality of healthcare outcomes has not improved at par with the
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utilization rates, and the United States lags behind all other industrialized nations in this regard
(OECD, 2009).
A number of laws have been implemented over the years to make sure the utilization of
healthcare resources and related costs do not get out of hand. The 1946 federal Hill-Burton
program was aimed at funding new hospital construction in areas that most needed it. However, a
state would only receive these funds if it adopted a plan to evaluate the proposed projects (Lave
and Lave, 1974). Another significant milestone in this regard was the Certificate of Need (CON)
Law. The National Health Planning and Resource Development Act (NHPA) passed this law in
1974 to curtail unnecessary spending. Healthcare service availability, superior care quality and
enhanced competition without it leading to excess capacity or costly service redundancy were the
law’s intended goals (Conover and Sloan, 1998). 1 Thirty-six states still pursue it in various forms
and the law continues to have an impact on the healthcare industry within those states. Previous
literature has provided mixed findings on the effects of CON Law on entry to market, competition,
cost, and quality of care. A report from the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
in 2004 and another from Zeta in 2008 both point out that CON Law leads to higher prices as it
protects incumbents by acting as an entry barrier. Adding support to this argument, Greenberg
(1998) argues that CON Law causes difficulties both for hospitals trying to enter the healthcare
market and for existing hospitals trying to justify expenditures on a medical procedure already
available in other hospitals. Vaughan-Sarrazin et al. (2002) find that the law negatively impacts
health outcomes. In their study featuring coronary artery bypass graft surgery (CABG) patients,
they find mortality rates of CABG patients to be 22% higher in states with CON Law relative to
states without the law. Grabowski et al. (2003), in their study on Medicaid nursing home and long-

1

An overview of the CON Law in each state can be found in Hellinger (2009).
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term care find that repeal of CON Law led to a statistically insignificant increase in related
expenditures in these states.
The proponents of the law argue that the law deters excessive investments in expensive
technologies. They contend that hospitals given their ability to compete on the basis of non-price
attributes can very easily pass on the investment costs to the consumers (or the insurers). Ferrier
et al. (2010) similarly find CON Law to have a positive impact on healthcare costs. Specifically,
they demonstrate that CON Law states are able to deliver higher efficiency with regard to resource
allocation and outputs. Moreover, they find that longer the law has been in effect greater the
positive impact. Paul et al. (2014) find that CON Law statistically significantly reduces the average
Length of Stay (LOS) in the Emergency Department (ED) and therefore positively impacts health
care quality in the ED.
The primary goal of this study is to analyze empirically the impact of CON Law on
inpatient occupancy rate. Our measure of inpatient occupancy rate for each hospital is constructed
using total number of inpatient days (this is basically the sum of all patients days in a given year)
divided by total bed-days (365 times number of beds available). Our main contribution is that we
are one of the few studies that empirically investigate the theoretically unclear effects of CON Law
on inpatient occupancy rate, which is important for the improved understanding of the efficiency
of utilizing hospital facility. Theoretically, CON Law could affect both the numerator (inpatient
days) and denominator (number of beds) of the inpatient occupancy rate. On the one hand, CON
could reduce (or limit) the number of beds available as the law is designed to prevent the waste of
healthcare resources, which could result in a higher occupancy rate (through a decrease in the
denominator of the occupancy rate). This could lead to a decrease in healthcare costs because of
fewer beds (Gaynor and Anderson 1995, Keeler and Ying 1996, and Grabowski et al. 2003). On
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the other hand, CON may reduce inpatient days (or replace inpatient with outpatient care) since
hospitals in states with CON have an incentive to demonstrate better use of their facility.2 Hence,
this could decrease the inpatient occupancy rate (by reducing the numerator). It is, however, not
clear which of the effects will dominate. Therefore, it is worth exploring this question empirically.
We also contribute to the literature by controlling not only whether a state has CON Law
or not (represented by CON indicator variable in this study), but also the thresholds on
expenditures beyond which hospitals in a state with CON Law would have to put their expenditure
request through a formal review. Beyond such thresholds, a hospital or healthcare provider would
have to obtain approvals from the government if they were considering significant additions to
their capacity or entering a new service market. Generally, a higher threshold represents the less
stringent law, as in such a scenario only a handful of projects would have to go through a formal
review. In this study, we devote our attention to stringency as it applies to thresholds on service
expenditures.3
In line with the extant literature, both the supply and demand sides of the inpatient market
are also considered in our study. Examples include measures on health care supply, demographics,
socio-economic features, population health status and health insurance coverage, and state political
indicators. Finally, we also investigate potential endogeneity concerns associated with CON
indicator and its stringency.
Our paper has the following outline. We first discuss data and related summary statistics.
This is followed by a discussion of the empirical specification(s) we employ in section 3. Next, we

2

Prior literature such as Thomas et al. (1997), Kossovsky et al. (2002), Thi et al. (2004), Coffman and Rundall
(2005), White and Glazier (2011) to name a few show that shorter LOS is associated with improved patient care
quality and satisfaction.
3

In line with concerns raised about CON thresholds in prior literature such as Paul et al. (2014), we only consider
the threshold associated with service related expenditures.
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discuss results from our cross-sectional and panel models and related implications. We conclude
in the final section 5 with a discussion about potential avenues for future research.

II.

Data and Summary Statistics

The goal of this research endeavor is to analyze the effect of CON Law on inpatient occupancy
rate in the United States. We accomplish this using hospital-level data from American Hospital
Association

(AHA).

We

measure

occupancy

rate

as

follows

for

each

hospital:

Annual Inpatient Days

(𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 = [ Number of Beds∗365 ]) following extant literature (such as Sampson et al.,
2006; Connecticut Department of Public Health, 2013 among others). Inpatient Days data from
AHA from the years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2009 is used to build our dependent variable4.
Before we elaborate on other variables employed in our modeling specifications, we would like to
demonstrate the directional nature of this variable. Possibly, one might be inclined to interpret
higher values of occupancy rate to represent an efficient utilization of resources. However, higher
occupancy rate could be result of either more inpatient days or of the reduced number of beds. If
it is the former, then higher occupancy rate is not necessarily a positive outcome especially if it
entails a patient staying in a bed much longer than necessary. This instead would mean the care
delivery processes are actually inefficient. This notion finds some support in the extant literature.
For example, Scholle et al. (2005) highlight a negative correlation between quality of inpatient
care and inpatient days. Similarly, Madsen et al. (2014) find that high bed occupancy rates were
associated with a significant 9 percent increase in rates of in-hospital mortality and thirty-day
mortality, compared to low bed occupancy rates. The other side of this story is that lower

4

To mitigate any concerns that our data is not randomly selected due to longer gap between year 2006 and 2009, we
tested the robustness of our results by excluding 2009 from our sample. Our main results still hold.
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occupancy rate could be due to reduced inpatient days or an increase in number of beds. If it is the
former, then it is a positive outcome (Thomas et al., 1997; Kossovsky et al., 2002; Thi et al., 2004;
Coffman and Rundall, 2005; White and Glazier, 2011). Nonetheless, if it is the latter, then it could
also imply there are too many empty beds, which is a waste of resources and increases health care
costs (Gaynor and Anderson 1995, Keeler and Ying 1996, and Grabowski et al. 2003). In order to
bring some clarity to the picture, we estimate the relationship between CON Law and hospital
occupancy rate in inpatient care. Following are the variables featured in our modeling
specifications.
Our primary focus is on CON Law and a key feature - its stringency. The binary variable
helps us capture which states have CON Law. The stringency helps us differentiate between these
states as well as capture differences between those that have the Law and those that don’t. As noted
earlier, we capture stringency through an index that is modeled around the Law’s threshold for
service expenditures. Specifically, any service that involves expenditures beyond this threshold
would have to be approved by the state government. Further, low values of the threshold imply a
stringent CON Law whereas higher values represent a laxed law and therefore would be equivalent
in principle to those states without the law We define the index as as follows.
max 𝐶𝑂𝑁 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗 −𝐶𝑂𝑁 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖

(𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 = [ 𝑗∈𝐼

max 𝐶𝑂𝑁 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗

]),

𝑗∈𝐼

where statei is the state whose stringency index is calculated, and statej is any one of the states that
have reported some threshold in its CON law.
Notice that the index takes a value of 0 if the law is lenient (this is a case where the state
threshold equals to the maximum threshold of all states with CON Law) and it takes a value 1 if
the law is stringent (this is a case where the state requires all applications go through a review,
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meaning the threshold is zero)5. Also, the continuous nature of the index helps us capture the
variability noted among states in stringency within and over the years. Intuitively, inpatient
occupancy rate could be affected not only by inpatient care demand but also the market supply.
Additionally, it is plausible that the political and economic environment of a state could affect the
inpatient care market; hence, we include relevant measures in our modeling specifications.
To be more specific, on the supply side, we take into account important hospital
characteristics, such as: whether a hospital has at least 100 beds6, number of full-time physicians;
number of full-time nurses; whether the hospital is a member of Council of Teaching Hospitals
and Health Systems (COTH); whether the hospital has residency training approval by
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME); whether the hospital has
accreditation by Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO).
Furthermore, type of hospital could influence the type of patients accepted as well as their use of
inpatient services (length of stay, for instance), whether the hospital is in a rural or urban location.
Therefore, we also construct a measure of hospital type to differentiate long-term care hospitals
from the rest. We also consider type of ownership (not for profit, for profit, government-owned)
as a control in our models as these hospitals operate under different legal rules (tax exemptions,
non-distribution constraint, etc.) and therefore, face different constraints in terms of productivity,
and respond to profitability differently when making supply decisions (for example, government
hospitals are most likely to supply the unprofitable services that are disproportionately needed by

5

The value of the CON stringency is set to zero for states without CON Law, which implies no applications or
reviews are needed in such states.
6

We prefer to use the indicator of whether a hospital has at least 100 beds instead of the number of beds since the
latter is also used as part of the denominator of our dependent variable. This is a standard proxy of hospital size. For
instance, Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) uses statutory formulas to determine payments made to hospitals.
The formulas used for urban hospitals with 100 or more beds are more liberal than those applied to urban hospitals
with fewer than 100 beds. This suggests there is an incentive for hospitals to meet or exceed the 100- bed threshold,
pitting DSH payment formulas against CON Laws.
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poor and underinsured patients, etc.). All of these aspects associated with ownership type could,
in turn, impact inpatient occupancy rate.
On the healthcare demand side, we include demographic measures. Specifically, we
include variables that capture the age, gender and racial characteristics of the state population Their
inclusion finds support in the literature. For example, it is well known that health care needs of the
female population are more pronounced than the males and this can potentially affect the inpatient
care demand and related occupancy rate (NCHS, 2012). Similar reasoning motivates inclusion of
different age groups, in particular, the elderly who have increased health care needs compared to
the younger age groups. There is significant racial variability when it comes to health care
outcomes and socio-economics and this can potentially have an impact on inpatient care demand
and related occupancy rate motivating its inclusion (Census Bureau, 2013; NCHS, 2012).
As a second measure, we include the health insurance coverage of a state’s population. We
contend that population with employer-provided insurance have a better access to health care, are
more health conscious and generally younger. Such a population would be associated with reduced
inpatient care demand. Those on Medicare and Medicaid are expected to have an opposite reality
hold true.
As a third measure, we include the prevalence of obesity, extent of population that smoke
daily, drink heavily and the infant mortality rate in a state (CDC, 2014a; CDC, 2014b; CDC, 2014c;
CDC, 2014d). This we believe effectively captures the health status of the population. For
example, life style and behavioral choices made by expecting women are found to be associated
with infant mortality (CDC, 2014d). Further, a positive association between behavioral choices
such as smoking, drinking and obesity and healthcare costs is well documented (NCHS, 2012).
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As a fourth measure, we include median household income to capture the economic
environment in a state.7 The reason is that in economically well-off state, there might be a strong
incentive for the inpatient care providers to increase occupancy rate of inpatient services even if
there is no real demand to justify it as such patients have a greater ability to pay for these services
and hospitals might also not be faced with payment constraints that might be imposed by Medicare
and Medicaid. Similar motivation guides inclusion of variables that capture the state’s political
environment. These include the governor and senators’ political affiliation, the voting record of
these senators, affirmative votes cost, and deviation in their voting records. Their inclusion is now
well supported in the extant literature (Paul et al., 2014, 2017). For example, the voting record of
senators well captures the state’s political climate as rational senators are less likely to vote such
that it affects their future electoral opportunities.
Our research indicates that there exists no database that singularly contains all the data we
need and so we created a database for our needs borrowing from several sources (Appendix Table
A.1). Our final sample contains 20,277 observations at the hospital level with data pooled from
2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2009 years. This data set is at the national level which covers almost
all states. We lost 10,206 observations (30,483-20,277) due to missing information on variables
included in our study: whether the hospital is a member of COTH, JCAHO (loss of 98), thresholds
of CON Law (loss of 1,369), indicator for urban (328), senators opinions on proposals (loss of
826), proportion that drink heavily (loss of 4,930), infant mortality rate (loss of 250), hospital type
– acute long term care (loss of 1,415), median income and unemployment rate (loss of 85

7

We have accounted for the effect of inflation on our monetary variables in our empirical analyses. For consistency,
we did so in 1998 dollars.
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observations). We do not notice any pattern of missing information that raises concerns about
sample selection.
Note that variables such as population demographics, and those capturing political
environment, economic environment, population health status variables, population insurance
coverage, Gini index and index of science and technology are collected at the state level as several
of them (health status, political variables, and health insurance coverage for instance) are not
available at the community level (such as health service area). Besides, compared to emergency
care, the concept of “service area” could be less influential to inpatient care since unlike urgent
care, patients have more flexibility when they choose the place where they receive inpatient care
due to the less urgent nature of inpatient care in many cases. In order to maintain the consistency
of the measures we employ, we measure them all at the state level. However, we incorporate an
indicator of rural (urban) area of the hospital location hoping to capture the major differences
across various health service areas within a given state. Table 1 provides the summary statistics of
our sample with a comparison between hospitals in states with and without CON Law. The
variables are described in more detail in Appendix Table A.2.
-----------------------Table 1 about here-----------------------------It follows from Table 1 that CON states on average have smaller populations, larger proportion of
blacks and a lower proportion of people covered by privately purchased health insurance compared
to non-CON states. A higher proportion of hospitals in states with CON are members of COTH,
have approval for residency training, have JCAHO Accreditation, and are not for profit. Similarly,
they have an increased number of full-time physicians and nurses. CON states are more likely to
have Democrat governors and their senators are more cooperative as well.8 The CON States are
8

These differences have been tested to be statistically significant at the 5% level.
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also associated with: 1) higher Gini indices, which indicates more income inequality; and 2) lower
tech index, which indicates a slower rate of innovation adoption.
III.

Econometric Specifications

In this empirical study, we would like to explore the relationship between CON Law and hospital
inpatient occupancy rate. While the effect of CON Law on healthcare costs has been extensively
investigated, to the best of our knowledge, there is no prior literature that studies the effects of
CON Law on inpatient occupancy rate. Our analysis starts with a binary control of CON Law as
mostly used in previous studies, then we extend it with measures on the stringency of the law, and
finally, test the endogeneity of CON Law measure(s). In all our models, we also control for other
previously described important variables that capture the characteristics of the inpatient care
market, as well as the economic and political environment of a state.
We first estimate a pooled cross-sectional regression model as follows:
𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,

(1)

where HospOccit measures the inpatient occupancy rate in a given hospital i in time period t, CON
is a dummy variable that captures whether a state has CON Law or not, X includes all the other
covariates (such as hospital resources and characteristics, population characteristics in the state
where the hospital is located, and macro political and economic environment of the state), and ε
represents the error term.9 We have also treated hospitals in the same state as a cluster to adjust for
the standard error.
In order to tackle the existence of unobserved hospital heterogeneity, such as hospital
expectation regarding its own market power, or its plan for any changes to the size, we seize on

9

Given concerns about the existence of autocorrelation in the error term, we test for it. We do not find sufficient
statistical evidence to support the existence of autocorrelation with a p-value of 0.0939.
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advantages afforded to us by the panel setting of our data and focus on the following modeling
extension.
𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,

(2)

where 𝜏𝑖 represents time invariant unobserved hospital heterogeneity. If we assume there is no
correlation between 𝜏𝑖 and the observables, we can use the Random Effect (RE) model to estimate
the CON Law effects. Since we cannot rule out the possibility that the unobserved heterogeneity
could be correlated with some observables, the type of the hospital for, example, we further relax
the assumption by allowing for the existence of an arbitrary relationship between 𝜏𝑖 and the
observables, where we use the Fixed Effect (FE) model to uncover the story. We use a BreuschPagan Test to check the existence of this unobserved heterogeneity of hospital by comparing the
RE model with the pooled cross sectional one, and then use a Hausman type of test to compare the
estimation results from our RE and FE models10.
Worth noticing is that CON Indicator, our key variable of interest, is time-invariant in the
periods considered in this study.11 Therefore, theoretically, we are not able to estimate the effect
of CON in the FE model. In order to obtain some estimates of this key variable of interest that is

10

The reason we extend RE model to FE model is because we cannot rule out the possibility that the strong
assumption made in an RE model and that of no correlation between the observed and unobserved heterogeneity
may not hold. Therefore, we need to run an FE model and use Hausman test to investigate such a potential
correlation. To be more specific, the Hausman test sets its null hypothesis as “there is no correlation between the
unobserved and observables (RE is the preferred model)”, see chapter 9 in Greene (2008). The results of Hausman
test reject the null hypothesis and shows evidence of the existence of correlation between observed and unobserved
heterogeneity. This means RE model does not provide unbiased estimates. However, we are aware of the fact that
we cannot estimate the effects of time invariant variable (in our case, the indicator of CON Law is time invariant)
in a FE model. This motivated selection of Hausman Taylor approach for our research purposes. This specification
not only allows us to estimate the effect of CON indicator but also allows for the existence of correlation between
observed and unobserved heterogeneity.
11

During the period of study, the set of states with the CON Law has stayed the same, although variation in some
rules has taken place.
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time-invariant and at the same time allowing for some relationship between the observed and the
unobserved heterogeneity, we apply a Hausman Taylor (HT) type of model to obtain Generalized
IV (GIV) estimates. In this model, we allow correlation to exist between time-varying observables
and unobserved heterogeneity, with an assumption that CON (indicator) is exogenous
(uncorrelated with the unobserved heterogeneity) first.12 We then use a Hausman type of test to
compare the result of the HT model with that of the FE model.
Notice that the decision to persist with the law in a state depends on state-specific
characteristics, all of which are not observed (for example, a state’s attitude towards the rate of
inpatient occupancy rate). Hence, we need to test and find out if the CON Indicator is correlated
with the error term in equation (1) and (2). If the CON Indicator is indeed endogenous, then we
may end up with biased estimates of CON Law effects. Therefore, we first use a two-stage least
squares (2SLS) model13 to estimate the effects of the CON Law treating CON Law indicator as
endogenous. We follow this up with Durbin-Wu test to check whether empirical evidence supports
endogeneity associated with CON Indicator i.e. if it merits treatment as an endogenous variable.
We conduct the 2SLS estimation using the following specifications:
Stage one: 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2 𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡

(3)

̂𝑖𝑡 +𝛾2 𝑋𝑖𝑡 +µit
Stage two: HospOccit = 𝛾0 +𝛾1 𝐶𝑂𝑁

(4)

The likelihood of a state having CON Law as a function of Instrumental Variables (IVs)
and other covariates is estimated in the first stage. In the second stage, the inpatient occupancy rate

12

We treat CON Indicator as an endogenous variable next and test for this endogeneity.

13

We performed a robustness check with the help of a discrete model in the first step. We then used the predicted
probability of having CON from this stage as the IV in a 2SLS. Results of our main equation were found to be
consistent with the 2SLS specification. Only the results of 2SLS are reported as it makes for an easy comparison to
the results of models wherein CON Law indicator and the stringency of the law are both controlled.
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is estimated as a function of the predicted likelihood of having CON Law obtained from the first
stage and other covariates. Theoretically, at least one IV is to be included for each endogenous
variable for identification purposes. We use the index of science and technology14 and the Gini in
a state as our IVs.
The following explains our motivation behind choice of these IVs, i.e., we posit that they
are likely to influence whether a state has CON Law but not likely to influence the inpatient
occupancy rate because:
1) The index of science and technology in a state is likely to be associated with the speed
of technology adoption in a state. A technologically advanced state will usually have a
large technology sector. Such a state is therefore less probable to have the law due to
the hurt it can inflict on business interests within the state. On the other hand, states that
worry that the costs of such investments are less than the benefits are more likely to have
the law. These concerns that the effort to innovate often overtakes the effort to
economize find adequate support in extant literature (Bodenheimer, 2005). This might
also lead to a scenario wherein such states are technologically less innovative than those
without CON Law. This measure is based on how new technology is implemented in all
industries including but not limited to healthcare market. Hence, this measure is unlikely
to be determined only by the environment of healthcare market.

14

As per the Milken Institute (http://statetechandscience.org/statetech.taf?page=outline), "The State Technology and
Science Index provides a benchmark for states to assess their science and technology capabilities as well as the
broader ecosystem that contributes to job and wealth creation. The index computes and measures 79 individual
indicators relative to population, gross state product (GSP), number of establishments, number of businesses, and
other factors. Data sources include government agencies, foundations, and private sources. The states are ranked in
descending order with the top state being assigned a score of 100, the runner-up a score of 98, and the 50th state a
score of 2.". Detailed discussion of the methodology used to compute the index can be found at
http://statetechandscience.org/statetech.taf?page=outline.
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2) The Gini index is a measure of distribution of income. An increase in this index indicates
an increase in income inequality in a state (World Bank, 2013). Hospitals in states with
more poor patients receive subsidies because poor people are unlikely to have the ability
to pay for inpatient services. In particular, under the Inpatient Prospective Payment
System (IPPS), the base payment rate (based on the patient diagnosis-related group
(DRG)) to hospitals is adjusted to include an add-on payment - the Disproportionate
Share Hospital (DSH) adjustment (CMS, 2014). DSH permits a percentage increase in
Medicare payment to those hospitals serving large proportion of indigent patients.
Additionally, it includes a provision to increase this IPPS payment for expensive patient
cases. Therefore, governments of states with more poor people would have valid
concerns that hospitals could easily pass on the cost of unnecessary treatment to them
and use the additional payments to expand capacity. In such cases, the corresponding
state has a strong incentive to retain the law in an effort to hinder capacity expansion by
hospitals. This indicates that Gini index is less likely to influence inpatient occupancy
rate, which is usually determined by patients’ health need once hospital capacity is fixed,
but rather, is more likely to impact whether a state has CON Law or not.
The validity of these two IVs is ascertained via statistical tests. Finally, we perform Durbin-Wu
(Hausman type) test to check whether empirical evidence supports endogeneity associated with
CON Indicator i.e. if it merits treatment as an endogenous variable.
We also test on the endogeneity of CON Indicator in the panel setting first in an RE
specification, and then in an HT Type of model (since our key variable is time-invariant).
Stage one: 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2 𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡

(5)

̂𝑖𝑡 +𝛾2 𝑋𝑖𝑡 +𝜔𝑖 +µit
Stage two: HospOccit = 𝛾0 +𝛾1 𝐶𝑂𝑁

(6)
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In the RE model where we treat the CON Indicator as the only endogenous variable, we actually
estimate a Generalized 2SLS (G2SLS) model: first, we regress the CON Indicator on exogenous
variables Xit and IVs; second, we regress HospOcc on the estimated CON Indicator from stage1
and Xit assuming no relation between all the covariates and the unobserved heterogeneity in an RE
specification. Then we relax this assumption by allowing relationships between the covariates (we
assume CON Indicator to be endogenous in this specification) and the unobserved heterogeneity
in an HT Type model. We use a Hausman type of test to assess the endogeneity of CON Indicator
in both RE (by comparing it to the RE with CON Indicator as exogenous) and Hausman Taylor
specifications (by comparing it to an HT model where the CON Indicator is treated as exogenous).
Next, we extend our analysis by controlling for the stringency of the CON Law on service
spending using a similar configuration. Theoretically, it is vital to take this measure of the
stringency of CON Law into account15 to understand the relationship between CON Law and
inpatient occupancy rate as discussed in a previous section. Similar to the previous section, we
start our analysis by treating the stringency of CON Law as exogenous in a pooled OLS
specification as follows:
𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝐶𝑂𝑁 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(7)

We then extend our study to control for the existence of unobserved hospital heterogeneity by
taking advantage the panel setting of our data. Our model of interest is presented below:
𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝐶𝑂𝑁 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,

(8)

where 𝜏𝑖 represents time invariant unobserved hospital heterogeneity. There are two types of
specifications possible known as fixed effects and random effects. The fixed effects model allows

15

To assuage any concerns about the possible existence of multicollinearity between CON indicator and this
measure on its stringency, we computed the variance inflation factor (VIF=7.69) and tolerance (0.130). Our findings
ease such concerns about our study models and related results..
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𝜏𝑖 to be correlated with the observed explanatory variables. In contrast, the random effects model
assumes that these are not correlated. Using a Hausman test, we can test which of these
specifications is valid. We can also test between a random effects model and pooled OLS
regression using a Breusch-Pagan test. For the reason provided earlier in this section, we use an
HT model to identify the effects of the time invariant CON Indicator while allowing the existence
of relationship between the observed factors and the unobserved heterogeneity. We then use a
Hausman type of test to compare our results of the FE and HT model.
As noted earlier in this section, it is worth testing whether the CON Stringency should be
treated as an endogenous variable. We tackle this empirical issue using a 2SLS Model as follows16:
Stage one: 𝐶𝑂𝑁 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2 𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃3 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡

(9)

̂
Stage two: HospOccit = 𝛾0 +𝛾1 𝐶𝑂𝑁 𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
𝑖𝑡 +𝛾2 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3 𝑋𝑖𝑡 +µit

(10)

In this specification, we use the following IVs for stringency: tech index, and GINI index. The
relationship between tech index and service stringency could go either way. This is because a
technologically advanced state with CON Law could be strict in approving hospital capacity
expansions. This, in turn, would help improve the technological innovativeness standing of the
state. One can find analogies to this effect in student selection procedure employed by Ivy League
schools. The rigor employed helps them select the best students which in turn contributes to
sustenance and improvement of the school’s notable standing in the field. In sum, a positive
relationship between tech index and service stringency finds support.
On the other hand, there could also be technologically advanced states with a large
technology sector that provides both jobs and taxes. Such states will not be in favor of a strict CON
Law if they believe it could hurt business interests in the state. A low stringency index (equal to

16

Based on insights from the Hausman test regarding the endogeneity of CON Law in equation (3) and (4), CON
Law indicator is treated as exogenous in this model.
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zero) would also capture those states that do not have CON Law for similar reasons. This would
support a negative relationship between tech index and service stringency.
As indicated earlier, hospitals in states that have higher low-income patient base proportion
get subsidies towards the cost of care and provisions to increase such payments for expensive
patient cases. Therefore, the governments of such states would have valid concerns that hospitals
could easily pass on the cost of unnecessary treatment to them and use resulting revenues for
capacity expansion purposes. This would, in turn, provide the state an incentive to curb the
excessive expansion of hospitals by lowering the threshold or by increasing the stringency of the
Law. This indicates that GINI index is less likely to influence inpatient occupancy rate but is more
likely to impact the CON Law stringency. Furthermore, we test the endogeneity of CON
Stringency in the panel setting first in an RE/FE specification (as below), and then in an HT Type
of model (since our other key variable-CON Indicator is time-invariant).
Stage one: 𝐶𝑂𝑁 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0 + +𝜃1 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃1 𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃3 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡

(11)

̂
Stage two: HospOccit = 𝛾0 +𝛾1 𝐶𝑂𝑁 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
𝑖𝑡 +𝛾2 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 +𝛾3 𝑋𝑖𝑡 +𝜔𝑖 +µit

(12)

In the RE model, we treat the CON Stringency as the endogenous variable. We then relax
this assumption by allowing relationships between the covariates (we assume CON Stringency as
endogenous and CON Indicator to be exogenous in this specification) and the unobserved
heterogeneity in an HT Type model. We use a Hausman type of test to assess the endogeneity of
CON stringency in both RE (by comparing it to the RE model where both CON Stringency and
CON Indicator are treated as exogenous) and Hausman Taylor specifications (by comparing it to
a HT model where both CON Stringency and CON Indicator are treated as exogenous).

IV.

Results
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Tables 2-5 below showcase our main empirical results. Table 4 includes our preferred
specification. Our key results are as follows.
1) CON Law (represented by the variable CON Indicator) helps reduce inpatient occupancy
rate by 46% (0.268/0.577)17 on average.18,19
2) The stringency of the law measured by service expenditure thresholds employed by
states with CON Law does not have a statistically significant impact on occupancy rate
once we control the CON Law indicator.
3) Hausman type of test indicates the existence of unobserved heterogeneity. And DurbinWu test results indicate that the hypothesis that CON Law and its stringency could be
treated as exogenous in estimation cannot be rejected. This means that CON law and
its stringency are uncorrelated with the existing unobserved heterogeneity.
Table 2 below presents the results of estimation of inpatient occupancy rate only controlling

17

0.268 is the regression coefficient of CON Indicator (Table 4, Hausman Taylor - Preferred Specification) and
0.577 is the average inpatient occupancy in states without CON Law (Table 1).
18

We also use quantile regression to investigate whether the effects of CON Law differ in different states with
various occupancy rates. The results show the magnitude of CON indicator decreases by 10% with increases in
occupancy (from 1st to the 3rd quartile), while the magnitude of the stringency of CON increases by 90%. Further,
given concerns that occupancy could also decrease if states with CON Law had an increase in bed supply over the
years that are focus of this study, we performed some additional analysis. We compared the trend in changes in
number of beds over time for hospitals in states with and without CON Law. Our results show that, on average,
hospitals in states with CON Law were downsizing over the time period we study, while those in states without
CON Law expanded their bed supply slightly even though they already have lower bed occupancy compared to
states with CON Law. This may indicate some unnecessary expansion in states without CON Law. Further,
difference in changes of number of beds between hospitals in states with (without) CON Law is statistically
significant. This downsizing trend is in line with the increased utilization concerns that exists with regard to
inpatient care in the United States and also implies that CON Law does have effects on curbing unnecessary hospital
expansion.
19

To assuage any concerns that reduction effects re driven by time effects, we include dummy variables for years.
Our results do not exhibit any noticeable patterns. Further, using a treatment effect model, we find that if all states in
U.S. had CON Law, the national average occupancy rate in our sample will be 58.29%, and if all states in US had no
CON Law, the average is 69.28%, which leads to a difference of 10.99% in occupancy rate of Inpatient care.
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for a binary indicator of whether a state has CON Law or not.20 We have included results from
OLS and HT specifications, where CON Indicator is treated as exogenous21. Our main result is
that CON Law is negatively associated with the inpatient occupancy rate. This effect becomes
more statistically significant once we take into account the unobserved heterogeneity. This
possibly indicates that the effect of CON Law on reducing the length of stay dominates the effect
on reducing the number of beds in a given healthcare market.
Other findings include the following:
1). Many hospital characteristics are significantly associated with inpatient occupancy
rate. For example, hospitals who have more full-time nurses, or have at least 100 beds,
or are located in urban areas, or are a member of the council of teaching, or are
approved for resident training are likely to have higher occupancy rate. Hospitals
owned by government compared to for-profit hospitals have lower occupancy rate.
2). Inpatient occupancy rate reduces with an increase in the size of the population in a
state. Intuitively, this could mean given constraints on inpatient care resources, these
states tend to use available capacity more judiciously so the population that requires
inpatient care can still receive it.

20

We also check the robustness of our results by including a group of dummies for each state to take care of the
state fixed effect beyond the economic and political measures already in control. Our results do not change in any
significant way, and these state dummies are not jointly significant, which might indicate our other measures of state
environment are able to capture the state effects reasonably well.
21

We only report these two specifications based on the results of relevant statistical tests: 1) Breush Pagan test
comparing RE and OLS models provides some evidence of the existence of unobserved heterogeneity of hospital (pvalue<0.01); 2) A Hausman type of test comparing RE versus FE models indicates that RE is inconsistent or
misspecified (p-value <0.01), hence an FE model is more appropriate; 3) A Hausman type of test comparing FE with
HT model results indicates that HT estimates are adequate (p-value>0.1). We do not notice any significant change in
magnitudes and directional nature of coefficients associated with variables that have a statistically significant impact
on inpatient occupancy in both these models. As mentioned above, the motivation for developing an HT type of
model is the inability of FE to estimate coefficients of time invariant variables, in this case a key variable considered
in our study. In short, we prefer the Hausman Taylor specification in Table 2 based on the test results mentioned
above.
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3) States with a larger proportion of population younger than 18 years old are associated
with lower occupancy rate, which might be a result of lower health (inpatient care)
demand.
4) States with more Democratic senators have lower inpatient occupancy rate.
5) States with higher unemployment rate are associated with lower occupancy rate. This
possibly implies that when residents of a state cannot afford healthcare, they either
reduce or delay their health care consumption (inpatient care) that is not urgently
needed.
-----------------------Table 2 about here-----------------------------As a next step, we investigate whether CON Indicator should be treated endogenously.
These results are presented in Table 3 (the first stage of the estimation are presented in Table A.3).
In the endogenous OLS model, the Durbin-Wu test (with a p-value of 0.7326) shows that we cannot
reject the hypothesis that CON Indicator could be treated as exogenous. 22 We also perform an
endogeneity test for our RE and HT specifications. A Hausman type test for both specifications
(RE – p-value>0.1 and HT – p-value>0.1) indicates that we are not able to reject the hypothesis
that CON Indicator could be treated as exogenous.
-----------------------Table 3 about here-----------------------------We next take into account a characteristic of the CON Law known as stringency index of
service (discussed above). In Table 4, we present our estimates of CON Law effects with the
stringency of the law.
-----------------------Table 4 about here------------------------------

22

The first stage F-test yielded a p-value<0.0001. The over-identification test indicated a p-value= 0.6097. In the
Stock-Yogo test, Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 232.00. These indicate we have strong and valid IVs.
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As in the case of exogenous models (Table 2), we have included results from pooled (OLS)
and HT Type model given the inability of FE to estimate coefficients of time-invariant variables.
Compared to Table 2, after we take into account the stringency of CON law, our estimation results
present a similar story which is that CON law reduces the inpatient occupancy rate. Other findings
that we described earlier in this section remain the same, such as the effects of population size, the
proportion of female, patients covered by Medicare, and so on and so forth.23
As a next step, we investigate the potential issue of endogeneity for CON Stringency. The
results of the first stage estimation are reported in Table A.4. As we have explained in the data
section, the tech index and Gini index could be related to the likelihood whether a state keeps CON
Law. As can be noted from Table A.4, the estimates of these two variables turn out to be positive
and statistically significant, which supports our earlier argument. The estimates of the main stage
are presented in Table 5. In the endogenous OLS model, the Durbin-Wu test (with a p-value of
0.6748) shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that CON Stringency could be treated as
exogenous.24 We also perform an endogeneity test for our RE and HT specifications. A Hausman
test for both specifications (RE – p-value>0.1 and HT – p-value>0.1) indicates that we are not able
to reject the hypothesis that CON Stringency could be treated as exogenous. In the endogenous FE
model, the Durbin-Wu test (with a p-value of 0.7666) shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis
that CON stringency could be treated as exogenous.25

23

A few important items to note: 1) Breush Pagan test comparing RE and OLS models indicates existence of
unobserved heterogeneity of hospital (p-value<0.001); 2) A Hausman type of test comparing RE versus FE models
indicates that RE is inconsistent or misspecified (p-value <0.001) hence a FE model is appropriate; 3) A Hausman
type of test comparing FE with HT model results indicates that HT estimates are adequate (p-value>0.1).
24

The first stage F-test yielded a p-value<0.0001. The over-identification test indicated a p-value= 0.6510. In the
Stock-Yogo test, Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 1741.81. These indicate we have strong and valid IVs.
25

The first stage F-test yielded a p-value<0.0001). The over-identification test indicated a p-value= 0.8752. In the
Stock-Yogo test, Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 871.026. These indicate we have strong and valid IVs.
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-----------------------Table 5 about here-----------------------------In light of our findings that both CON Law and its stringency could be treated as
exogenous, we next elaborate on results from exogenous specifications included in Table 4, our
preferred models. All of our findings noted earlier in Table 2 hold. The main result is that CON
Law has a statistically significant negative impact on inpatient occupancy rate.
To summarize, in all specifications presented in Tables 2 through 5, we report the results
of four different models. i) Control for CON Law indicator and treat it as exogenous (Table 2). ii)
Control for CON Law indicator and treat it as endogenous (Table 3). iii) Control for CON Law
indicator and its stringency and treat both as exogenous (Table 4). iv) Control for CON Law
indicator and its stringency and treat CON Law stringency as endogenous (Table 5). Based on a
variety of appropriate statistical tests, such as the Durbin-Wu test, and Hausman type of test, we
reach the general conclusion that the Hausman Taylor specifications in Tables 2 and 4 are our
preferred specification. This is because of several reasons viz. the existence of observed
heterogeneity, no change in CON Law existence for each state over time in the period of our study,
and the exogeneity found in CON Law. In both preferred specifications, we see the estimates of
the CON Law effects on occupancy rate in inpatient care are negative and statistically significant.

V.

Conclusions

As discussed in the first section of the paper, CON Law was designed to reduce healthcare costs.
Given that increased inpatient care utilization and related costs have been continuously highlighted
as a serious concern in the United States, to study whether or not the law is accomplishing its
original intention is worthwhile. As we discussed in the introduction, whether CON Law has a
positive or negative relation on inpatient occupancy rate remains an open question. This is mainly
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because CON Law could be associated with a higher occupancy rate by reducing number of empty
beds, or it could be associated with a lower occupancy by helping shorten the average length of
stay.
We use a panel data set of hospitals in our empirical study. Our results indicate that CON
Law on average has a negative impact on the rate of occupancy. This could imply the effects of
CON on reducing LOS dominate its effects on reducing number of beds available. Moreover, we
do not find sufficient statistical evidence to reject the assumption that CON and its features are
exogenous.
Other key results are as follows.
1) Inpatient occupancy rate reduces with increase in the size of the population in a state.
2) Inpatient occupancy rate is positively related to the proportion of females in the state.
3) A statistically significant negative relationship is noted between occupancy rate and
proportion of the population on Medicare.
4) Some key features of hospital, such as hospital size (number of beds, full-time nurses),
ownership type, membership of council of teaching, approval of residency training, and
hospital urban (versus rural) location, all have a significant impact on inpatient
occupancy rate.
In summary, our results indicate that CON Law can help mitigate the increased inpatient care
utilization issues. Our findings have significant policy implications with regard to CON Law’s
impact on healthcare. This paper considers the effect of the CON Law on one particular measure
of quality. It will be interesting to check if the results are robust to other measures of quality.
It is worth noticing that we do not analyze in detail how CON law reduces occupancy rate
of inpatient care. Namely, we do not investigate whether CON law directly reduces the average
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length of stay or it encourages hospitals to replace inpatient care with another type of care
(outpatient care for instance). This topic in itself is very interesting and we plan to pursue it in
future.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Variables (Hospital-Years Level)
Hospitals in states
Hospitals in states
Sample
without CON
with CON
(n=20277)
(n=7516)
(n= 12761)
Std.
Std.
Std.
Mean
Mean
Mean
Deviation
Deviation
Deviation
Inpatient Occupancy
0.595
(0.252)
0.577
(0.312)
0.606
(0.207)
CON Law
CON Indicator
0.629
(0.483)
0.000
(0.000)
1.000
(0.000)
Stringency Index – Service
0.401
(0.477)
0.000
(0.000)
0.638
(0.459)
Stringency Threshold – Service
(Billions of Dollars)
0.147
0.319
0.000
(0.000)
0.234
0.376
Hospital Characteristics
Full Time Physicians and
Dentists
16.120 (65.359)
12.339 (54.253) 18.347 (71.001)
Full Time Nurses
167.788 (264.758)
152.740 (247.132) 176.652 (274.234)
Member of Council of Teaching
0.065
(0.246)
0.046
(0.209)
0.076
(0.265)
Resident Training Approval
0.183
(0.387)
0.146
(0.353)
0.205
(0.404)
JCAHO Accreditation
0.733
(0.442)
0.679
(0.467)
0.764
(0.424)
Not For Profit
0.542
(0.498)
0.486
(0.500)
0.574
(0.494)
Government Ownership
0.032
(0.177)
0.031
(0.173)
0.033
(0.179)
Acute Long Term Care Hospital
0.071
(0.257)
0.076
(0.265)
0.068
(0.252)
Urban
0.788
(0.409)
0.789
(0.408)
0.788
(0.409)
Number of Beds
162.737 (181.644)
146.045 (170.256) 172.569 (187.340)
Hospital Size
0.491
(0.500)
0.438
(0.496)
0.522
(0.500)
Demographics
Population Size (in millions)
10.913
(9.800)
16.573 (12.775)
7.579
(5.149)
Proportion - Female
0.493
(0.006)
0.497
(0.005)
0.490
(0.005)
Proportion - Male
0.507
(0.006)
0.503
(0.005)
0.510
(0.005)
Proportion (age 0-17)
0.250
(0.017)
0.261
(0.018)
0.244
(0.012)
Proportion (18-44)
0.380
(0.016)
0.386
(0.017)
0.376
(0.014)
Proportion (45-64)
0.245
(0.017)
0.236
(0.018)
0.251
(0.014)
Proportion (65 and older)
0.125
(0.018)
0.117
(0.018)
0.129
(0.015)
Proportion - White
0.813
(0.092)
0.846
(0.050)
0.793
(0.104)
Proportion - Black
0.125
(0.090)
0.075
(0.036)
0.153
(0.098)
Proportion - Asian
0.035
(0.039)
0.045
(0.041)
0.030
(0.037)
Proportion - Amer Indian
0.011
(0.018)
0.016
(0.021)
0.008
(0.015)
Proportion - Pacific
0.002
(0.006)
0.002
(0.002)
0.002
(0.008)
Proportion - Oth Race
0.015
(0.013)
0.016
(0.005)
0.014
(0.015)
Health Status
Obesity
24.851
(3.554)
24.294
(3.581) 25.178
(3.496)
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Proportion - Smoke Daily
Proportion - Drink Heavily
Infant Mortality Rate
Health Care Access and Supply
Proportion - Emp Ins
Proportion - Priv Ins
Proportion - Medicaid
Proportion - Medicare
Proportion - Uninsured
Political and economic
environment
Senator Mean
Senator Deviation
Number of Democratic Senators
Democrat Governor
Republican Governor
Independent Governor
Proportion - Inpatient Days Medicare
Proportion - Inpatient Days Medicaid
Unemployment Rate
Median Income
Instrumental Variables
Gini
Tech Index

15.389
5.170
2.067

(3.483)
(1.071)
(0.492)

13.642
5.227
1.993

(3.290)
(0.969)
(0.370)

16.418
5.136
2.111

(3.169)
(1.125)
(0.546)

0.535
0.091
0.117
0.123
0.134

(0.053)
(0.023)
(0.030)
(0.018)
(0.043)

0.521
0.096
0.116
0.114
0.154

(0.051)
(0.026)
(0.030)
(0.016)
(0.053)

0.544
0.088
0.117
0.128
0.123

(0.053)
(0.021)
(0.030)
(0.016)
(0.030)

0.514
0.226
1.017
0.427
0.565
0.009

(0.361)
(0.275)
(0.870)
(0.495)
(0.496)
(0.092)

0.427
0.192
0.772
0.284
0.698
0.018

(0.372)
(0.231)
(0.896)
(0.451)
(0.459)
(0.131)

0.565
0.245
1.161
0.510
0.486
0.003

(0.344)
(0.296)
(0.822)
(0.500)
(0.500)
(0.057)

0.452

(0.238)

0.453

(0.248)

0.452

(0.233)

0.184
0.061
41.676

(0.183)
(0.020)
(6.463)

0.176
0.061
42.553

(0.178)
(0.018)
(5.676)

0.188
0.061
41.159

(0.185)
(0.021)
(6.832)

0.452
55.144

(0.020)
(13.567)

0.451
61.603

(0.019)
(11.244)

0.452
51.340

(0.020)
(13.378)
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Table 2: Effect of CON Indicator on Inpatient Occupancy

Variables

CON Indicator
Full Time Physicians and Dentists
Full Time Nurses
Member of Council of Teaching
Resident Training Approval
JCAHO Accreditation
Not For Profit
Government Ownership
Acute Long Term Care Hospital
Urban
Hospital Size
Population Size
Proportion - Female
Proportion (age 0-17)
Proportion (18-44)
Proportion (45-64)
Proportion - Black
Proportion - Asian
Proportion - Amer Indian
Proportion - Pacific
Proportion - Oth Race
Proportion - Emp Ins
Proportion - Priv Ins
Proportion - Medicaid
Proportion - Medicare
Obesity
Proportion - Smoke Daily
Proportion - Drink Heavily
Infant Mortality Rate
Senator Mean
Senator Deviation
Number of Democratic Senators
Gov_demo
Gov_ind
Proportion - Inpatient Days - Medicare

CON Indicator as Exogenous
Hausman
Cross Sectional
Taylor
Std.
Std.
Coef.
Coef.
Error
Error

-0.112
(0.080)
-0.266**
(0.126)
0.00001 (0.00003)
-0.0001 (0.00004)
0.0001*** (0.00001) 0.0001*** (0.00002)
0.009
(0.008) 0.055***
(0.021)
0.002
(0.005) 0.026***
(0.010)
0.048***
(0.004)
0.004
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.003) 0.032***
(0.011)
-0.164***
(0.010)
-0.160**
(0.071)
0.113***
(0.006)
-0.010
(0.008)
0.070***
(0.004) 0.095***
(0.008)
0.062***
(0.004) 0.024***
(0.006)
-0.013***
(0.004)
-0.010**
(0.004)
7.052
(4.368)
7.227*
(3.967)
-3.123**
(1.421)
-2.483**
(1.215)
-1.187
(1.373)
-0.501
(1.263)
-1.491
(1.630)
-0.803
(1.340)
0.432
(0.388)
0.967
(0.720)
4.530***
(1.613) 4.067***
(1.407)
2.616**
(1.274)
-2.308
(4.250)
-4.971
(8.543)
7.440 (27.976)
-6.327
(4.928)
-5.787
(5.234)
-0.292
(0.202)
-0.307*
(0.158)
-0.004
(0.254)
-0.091
(0.204)
-0.0353
(0.229)
-0.041
(0.180)
-0.390
(0.315)
-0.247
(0.244)
0.000
(0.001)
0.0004
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.002
(0.003)
(0.002
(0.002)
0.001
(0.006)
0.002
(0.005)
0.029
(0.024)
0.029
(0.019)
0.002
(0.009)
0.004
(0.007)
-0.014
(0.009)
-0.014**
(0.007)
-0.007
(0.005)
-0.005
(0.004)
0.015
(0.021)
0.021
(0.016)
-0.292***
(0.008) -0.193***
(0.014)
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Proportion - Inpatient Days - Medicaid
0.054***
Unemployment Rate
-0.592***
Median Income
0.002
Constant
-1.182
N
21396
*
indicates statistical significance at the 10% level
**
indicates statistical significance at the 5% level
***
indicates statistical significance at the 1% level

(0.010)
(0.171)
(0.001)
(2.809)

-0.002
-0.613***
0.002*
-1.694

(0.014)
(0.138)
(0.001)
(2.571)
21396
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Table 3: Effect of CON Indicator on Inpatient Occupancy
CON Indicator as Endogenous

Variables

CON Indicator
Full Time Physicians and Dentists
Full Time Nurses
Member of Council of Teaching
Resident Training Approval
JCAHO Accreditation
Not For Profit
Government Ownership
Acute Long Term Care Hospital
Urban
Hospital Size
Population Size
Proportion - Female
Proportion (age 0-17)
Proportion (18-44)
Proportion (45-64)
Proportion - Black
Proportion - Asian
Proportion - Amer Indian
Proportion - Pacific
Proportion - Oth Race
Proportion - Emp Ins
Proportion - Priv Ins
Proportion - Medicaid
Proportion - Medicare
Obesity
Proportion - Smoke Daily
Proportion - Drink Heavily
Infant Mortality Rate
Senator Mean
Senator Deviation
Number of Democratic Senators
Gov_demo
Gov_ind
Proportion - Inpatient Days - Medicare

Cross Sectional
Std.
Coef.
Error

Hausman Taylor
Std.
Coef.
Error

-0.296
(0.546)
-0.182
(0.120)
0.00001 (0.00003) 0.000001 (0.00003)
0.0001*** (0.00001) 0.0001*** (0.00001)
0.009
(0.008)
0.021*
(0.011)
0.002
(0.005)
0.014**
(0.007)
0.048***
(0.004) 0.026***
(0.005)
-0.003
(0.003)
-0.005
(0.005)
-0.164***
(0.010) -0.121***
(0.016)
-0.013
(0.004) 0.049***
(0.007)
0.113***
(0.006) 0.090***
(0.007)
0.070***
(0.004) 0.037***
(0.005)
0.062***
(0.004)
-0.010**
(0.004)
12.978 (17.886)
7.782**
(3.941)
-4.595
(4.536)
-2.336*
(1.206)
-2.368
(3.719)
-0.409
(1.254)
-2.601
(3.634)
-0.595
(1.331)
0.782
(1.096)
1.115
(0.713)
4.803***
(1.799) 4.352***
(1.392)
5.175
(7.598)
-2.419
(4.220)
-0.880
(14.701)
4.890 (27.758)
-8.100
(7.150)
-5.801
(5.199)
-0.322
(0.219)
-0.296*
(0.157)
-0.011
(0.255)
-0.053
(0.203)
0.064
(0.371)
-0.032
(0.179)
-0.485
(0.421)
-0.223
(0.243)
0.000
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.002
(0.003)
0.002
(0.002)
0.001
(0.006)
0.0022
(0.005)
0.021
(0.032)
0.028
(0.019)
0.004
(0.011)
0.003
(0.007)
-0.012
(0.012)
-0.014*
(0.007)
-0.006
(0.007)
-0.005
(0.004)
0.020
(0.026)
0.020
(0.016)
-0.292***
(0.008) -0.178***
(0.013)
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Proportion - Inpatient Days - Medicaid
0.054***
Unemployment Rate
-0.736
Median Income
0.002
Constant
-3.028
N
21396
*
indicates statistical significance at the 10% level
**
indicates statistical significance at the 5% level
***
indicates statistical significance at the 1% level

(0.010)
(0.455)
(0.001)
(6.090)

-0.001
-0.590***
0.002*
-2.192

(0.014)
(0.137)
(0.001)
(2.555)
21396
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Table 4: Effects of CON Indicator and its Stringency on Inpatient Occupancy
CON Threshold as Exogenous
Cross Sectional
Variables

CON Indicator
CON Stringency - Service
Full Time Physicians and Dentists
Full Time Nurses
Member of Council of Teaching
Resident Training Approval
JCAHO Accreditation
Not For Profit
Government Ownership
Acute Long Term Care Hospital
Urban
Hospital Size
Population Size
Proportion - Female
Proportion (age 0-17)
Proportion (18-44)
Proportion (45-64)
Proportion - Black
Proportion - Asian
Proportion - Amer Indian
Proportion - Pacific
Proportion - Oth Race
Proportion - Emp Ins
Proportion - Priv Ins
Proportion - Medicaid
Proportion - Medicare
Obesity
Proportion - Smoke Daily
Proportion - Drink Heavily
Infant Mortality Rate
Senator Mean
Senator Deviation
Number of Democratic Senators
Gov_demo
Gov_ind

Coef.

Std.
Error

Hausman Taylor
Std.
Coef.
Error

-0.100
(0.082)
-0.268**
(0.130)
-0.004
(0.014)
-0.002
(0.008)
0.00001 (0.00003)
-0.0001* (0.00005)
0.0001*** (0.00001) 0.0001*** (0.00002)
0.010
(0.008) 0.058***
(0.022)
-0.002
(0.005) 0.027***
(0.010)
0.047***
(0.004)
0.006
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.004) 0.036***
(0.012)
-0.163***
(0.010)
-0.179**
(0.086)
0.110***
(0.006)
-0.009
(0.009)
0.068***
(0.005) 0.093***
(0.008)
0.062***
(0.004) 0.022***
(0.006)
-0.013***
(0.004)
-0.010**
(0.005)
6.643
(4.480)
6.731
(4.164)
-3.290**
(1.464)
-2.533**
(1.247)
-1.179
(1.420)
-0.548
(1.366)
-1.589
(1.670)
-0.840
(1.378)
0.419
(0.396)
0.977
(0.737)
4.499***
(1.685) 3.987***
(1.430)
2.445*
(1.335)
-2.685
(4.365)
-6.196
(8.844)
7.668 (31.290)
-5.670
(5.210)
-5.598
(5.976)
-0.238
(0.217)
-0.268
(0.172)
0.081
(0.270)
-0.040
(0.217)
0.066
(0.252)
0.035
(0.202)
-0.393
(0.328)
-0.234
(0.258)
0.000
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.0006
(0.002)
0.001
(0.003)
0.002
(0.002)
0.000
(0.006)
0.002
(0.005)
0.030
(0.025)
0.029
(0.020)
0.002
(0.009)
0.003
(0.007)
-0.015
(0.010)
-0.015*
(0.008)
-0.008
(0.005)
-0.006
(0.004)
0.015
(0.022)
0.021
(0.017)
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Proportion - Inpatient Days - Medicare
-0.290***
Proportion - Inpatient Days - Medicaid
0.056***
Unemployment Rate
-0.596***
Median Income
0.002
Constant
-1.849
N
20277
*
indicates statistical significance at the 10% level
**
indicates statistical significance at the 5% level
***
indicates statistical significance at the 1% level

(0.008)
(0.010)
(0.175)
(0.001)
(2.900)

-0.200***
-0.001
-0.612***
0.002*
-1.444

(0.014)
(0.015)
(0.141)
(0.001)
(2.692)
20277

Table 5: Effects of CON Indicator and its Stringency on Inpatient Occupancy
CON Threshold as Endogenous
Cross Sectional
Variables

CON Indicator
CON Stringency - Service
Full Time Physicians and Dentists
Full Time Nurses
Member of Council of Teaching
Resident Training Approval
JCAHO Accreditation
Not For Profit
Government Ownership
Acute Long Term Care Hospital
Urban
Hospital Size
Population Size
Proportion - Female
Proportion (age 0-17)
Proportion (18-44)
Proportion (45-64)
Proportion - Black
Proportion - Asian
Proportion - Amer Indian
Proportion - Pacific
Proportion - Oth Race
Proportion - Emp Ins

Coef.

Std.
Error

-0.098
(0.082)
-0.015
(0.027)
0.00001 (0.00003)
0.0001*** (0.00001)
0.010
(0.008)
-0.002
(0.005)
0.047***
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.004)
-0.163***
(0.010)
0.110***
(0.006)
0.068***
(0.005)
0.062***
(0.004)
-0.013***
(0.004)
6.852
(4.491)
-3.392**
(1.474)
-1.415
(1.497)
-1.770
(1.705)
0.349
(0.420)
4.750***
(1.757)
2.600*
(1.367)
-6.093
(8.791)
-6.266
(5.330)
-0.178
(0.248)

Hausman Taylor
Std.
Coef.
Error

-1.031***
(0.220)
0.006
(0.009)
-0.0001 (0.0001)
0.0001*** (0.00002)
0.055**
(0.024)
0.023**
(0.011)
0.004
(0.008)
0.033**
(0.013)
-0.108
(0.099)
-0.007
(0.010)
0.086***
(0.010)
0.007
(0.008)
-0.001
(0.005)
11.190**
(4.683)
-3.274**
(1.409)
1.089
(1.535)
0.170
(1.554)
3.180***
(0.808)
3.852**
(1.616)
-15.444***
(4.806)
-31.280 (35.155)
-0.388
(6.733)
-0.351*
(0.194)
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Proportion - Priv Ins
0.067
Proportion - Medicaid
0.111
Proportion - Medicare
-0.350
Obesity
0.0004
Proportion - Smoke Daily
-0.001
Proportion - Drink Heavily
0.001
Infant Mortality Rate
-0.0003
Senator Mean
0.025
Senator Deviation
0.001
Number of Democratic Senators
-0.013
Gov_demo
-0.008
Gov_ind
0.015
Proportion - Inpatient Days Medicare
-0.290***
Proportion - Inpatient Days Medicaid
0.056***
Unemployment Rate
-0.605***
Median Income
0.002
Constant
-0.872
N
20277
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level

(0.271)
(0.268)
(0.339)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.006)
(0.027)
(0.009)
(0.011)
(0.005)
(0.022)

-0.075
-0.122
-0.295
0.000
-0.001
0.003
0.000
0.024
0.002
-0.015*
-0.003
0.027

(0.245)
(0.228)
(0.292)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.006)
(0.022)
(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.004)
(0.019)

(0.008)

-0.200***

(0.016)

(0.010)
(0.175)
(0.002)
(2.853)

-0.001
-0.584***
0.003*
-3.664

(0.017)
(0.160)
(0.001)
(3.059)
20277
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APPENDIX
Table A.1: Variable Description and Data Source
Detail
Level

Type

Data source

1 Inpatient Days

Hospital

Dependent

www.aha.org

Hospital
variables such as
type of hospital
(not for profit,
2 government
ownership, etc.),
number of full
time physicians
and nurses, etc.

Hospital

Independent

www.aha.org1

State

Independent

Hellinger (2009) see reference section for
more details

State

Independent

http://www.ahpanet.org/websites_copn.htm
l

State

Independent

6 Race Distribution State

Independent

7 Population

Independent

http://www.census.gov/popest/data/

Independent

http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.j
sp?cmprgn=1&cat=3&rgn=12&ind=125&s
ub=39

Independent

www.cdc.gov

Independent

www.cdc.gov

No

Variables

Extent of Con 3 stringency, None
etc.
CON Law
characteristics
4
such as service
threshold
5 Age distribution

County

% of uninsured,
Medicaid,
9
State
Medicare patients
in state
Percentage of
10
State
obese population
Percentage of
population that
11
State
smoke daily

1

http://www.census.gov/popest/estbygeo.ht
ml
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/Dataset
MainPageServlet?_program=PEP

All the American Hospital Association (AHA) data we use for this study comes from the Annual Survey Database.
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Percentage of
12 population that
drink heavily
Infant Mortality
13
Rate
Inpatient days
covered by
15
Medicare and
Medicaid
16 Median Income
18

Senators State
Voting Record

State

Independent

www.cdc.gov

State

Independent

www.cdc.gov

State

Independent

www.aha.org

State

Independent

http://www.bea.gov/regional/gsp/

State

Independent

http://www.adaaction.org/

19 Party in Power

State

20 Gini coefficient
Index of Science
21
& Technology

State
State

http://www.nga.org/cms/home/governors/p
ast-governorsIndependent
bios.html;jsessionid=567B4C3B27E3CF62
10B93BC608D3FED5
Instrumental www.census.gov
http://www.milkeninstitute.org/tech/tech20
Instrumental
10.taf?sub=tswf

Table A.2: Variable Categorization and Description
Variable name
Variable Description
Outcome Variable
Inpatient Occupancy
Measure built using Inpatient
days and beds in a hospital
Inpatient LOS
Measure built using Inpatient
days and Inpatient discharges
from a hospital

Independent Variables
CON Law
CON Indicator
Dummy variable for con law
coverage
Stringency Index - Service
Index of strictness of con
threshold on service, can take
values between 0 and 1
Hospital Characteristics
Full Time Physicians and Dentists Number of full time physicians
and dentists in a hospital
Full Time Nurses

Number of full time nurses in a
hospital
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Member of Council of Teaching

Dummy variable – whether
hospital is a member of council
of teaching

Resident Training Approval

Dummy variable – whether
hospital has approval for
resident training

JCAHO Accreditation

Dummy variable – whether
hospital has Joint Commission
of Healthcare Organizations
Accreditation (JCAHO)

Not For Profit

Dummy variable – whether
hospital is not for profit
Dummy variable – whether
hospital has government
ownership

Government Ownership

Urban

Dummy variable – whether
hospital is in a urban (1)
location or rural (0)

Acute Long Term Care Hospital

Dummy variable – whether
hospital is an acute long term
care facility or not

Hospital Size

Dummy variable – whether
hospital has at least 100 beds

Population Size
Proportion - Female
Proportion (age 0-17)
Proportion (18-44)
Proportion (45-64)
Proportion - Black
Proportion - Asian

Demographics
Population size (millions)
Proportion of female
Proportion of people aged 17 or
under
Proportion of people aged
between 18 and 44
Proportion of people aged
between 45 and 64
Proportion of population that is
Black
Proportion of population that is
Asian
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Proportion - Amer Indian
Proportion - Pacific
Proportion - Oth Race

Proportion of population that is
American Indian
Proportion of population that is
Pacific Islander
Proportion of population that
belongs to two or more races

Health Status
Obesity
Proportion of population that is
obese
Proportion - Smoke Daily
Proportion of population that
smoke daily
Proportion - Drink Heavily
Proportion of population that
drink heavily

Infant Mortality Rate

Death rate of children 5 and
under

Health Care Access and Supply
Proportion - Emp Ins
Proportion of individuals with
employer provided insurance
Proportion - Priv Ins
Proportion of individuals with
privately purchased insurance
Proportion - Medicaid
Proportion of individuals with
Medicaid
Proportion - Medicare
Proportion of individuals with
Medicare
Economic and Political Environment
Median Income
Median Income
Unemployment Rate
Self-explanatory
Proportion - Inpatient Days Medicare

Proportion of Inpatient days
covered by Medicare

Proportion - Inpatient Days Medicaid
Democrat Governor

Proportion of Inpatient days
covered by Medicaid
Dummy variable of Democratic
party governor
Dummy variable of governor
who is an Independent

Independent Governor
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Gini
Tech Index

Instrumental Variables
Gini Index (measure of
Inequality)
Index of Science & Technology

Table A.3: First Stage Regression of CON Indicator on Exogenous Variables

Variables
Full Time Physicians and Dentists
Full Time Nurses
Member of Council of Teaching
Resident Training Approval
JCAHO Accreditation
Not For Profit
Government Ownership
Acute Long Term Care Hospital
Urban
Hospital Size
Population Size
Proportion - Female
Proportion (age 0-17)
Proportion (18-44)
Proportion (45-64)
Proportion - Black
Proportion - Asian
Proportion - Amer Indian
Proportion - Pacific
Proportion - Oth Race
Proportion - Emp Ins
Proportion - Priv Ins
Proportion - Medicaid
Proportion - Medicare
Obesity
Proportion - Smoke Daily

CON Indicator as
Endogenous
Cross Sectional
Std.
Coef.
Error
-0.000003 (0.000002)
0.0000005
(0.000001)
0.0003
(0.001)
0.00008
(0.0004)
-0.001***
(0.0004)
0.001***
(0.0003)
0.0003
(0.001)
-0.001***
(0.0003)
0.001**
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.0004)
0.0002
(0.0003)
32.588***
(0.322)
-7.438***
(0.117)
-6.514***
(0.114)
-5.488***
(0.147)
1.715***
(0.032)
2.620***
(0.147)
14.053***
(0.054)
20.954***
(0.722)
-11.390***
(0.423)
-0.109***
(0.017)
-0.032
(0.022)
0.568***
(0.019)
-0.382***
(0.027)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
0.002***
(0.0002)
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Proportion - Drink Heavily
0.001***
Infant Mortality Rate
-0.001
Senator Mean
-0.041***
Senator Deviation
0.013***
Number of Democratic Senators
0.015
Gov_demo
0.008***
Gov_ind
0.026***
Proportion - Inpatient Days Medicare
-0.002**
Proportion - Inpatient Days Medicaid
0.000
Unemployment Rate
-0.748***
Median Income
-0.001***
Tech Index
0.001***
Gini
-0.518***
Constant
-10.3192***
N
21396
*
indicates statistical significance at the 10% level
**
indicates statistical significance at the 5% level
***
indicates statistical significance at the 1% level

(0.0002)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.0004)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.014)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.038)
(0.242)
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Table A.4: First Stage Regression of CON Stringency on Exogenous Variables

Variables
CON Indicator
Full Time Physicians and Dentists
Full Time Nurses
Member of Council of Teaching
Resident Training Approval
JCAHO Accreditation
Not For Profit
Government Ownership
Acute Long Term Care Hospital
Urban
Hospital Size
Population Size
Proportion - Female
Proportion (age 0-17)
Proportion (18-44)
Proportion (45-64)
Proportion - Black
Proportion - Asian
Proportion - Amer Indian
Proportion - Pacific
Proportion - Oth Race
Proportion - Emp Ins
Proportion - Priv Ins
Proportion - Medicaid
Proportion - Medicare
Obesity
Proportion - Smoke Daily
Proportion - Drink Heavily
Infant Mortality Rate
Senator Mean

CON Stringency as
Endogenous
Cross Sectional
Std.
Coef.
Error
0.253***
(0.052)
0.000009 (0.000017)
-0.000004 (0.000006)
0.0018
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.0027)
-0.002
(0.0022)
-0.0002
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.004)
0.002
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
-0.041***
(0.002)
35.345***
(2.992)
27.116***
(0.973)
36.624***
(0.933)
44.464***
(1.147)
-4.490***
(0.255)
26.791***
(1.136)
15.257***
(0.848)
45.374***
(5.652)
35.963***
(3.369)
4.173***
(0.135)
-0.868***
(0.172)
3.213***
(0.158)
2.394***
(0.214)
0.0063***
(0.0007)
0.033***
(0.0014)
-0.001
(0.0019)
-0.010**
(0.004)
-0.178***
(0.016)
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Senator Deviation
-0.107***
Number of Democratic Senators
0.076***
Gov_demo
0.001
Gov_ind
-0.024*
Proportion - Inpatient Days - Medicare
0.000
Proportion - Inpatient Days - Medicaid
0.005
Unemployment Rate
-1.591***
Median Income
-0.015***
Tech Index
0.012***
Gini
14.773***
Constant
39.985
N
21396
*
indicates statistical significance at the 10% level
**
indicates statistical significance at the 5% level
***
indicates statistical significance at the 1% level

(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.0031)
(0.014)
(0.005)
(0.007)
(0.111)
(0.0009)
(0.0005)
(0.297)
(1.918)
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